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Students from low-income families are eligible to student aid under the federal students’ 
financial assistance scheme (BAfoeG) in Germany. We evaluate the effectiveness of a recent 
reform of student aid that substantially increased the amount received by eligible students to 
raise enrolment rates into tertiary education. We view this reform as a ‘natural experiment’ 
and apply the difference-in-difference methodology using a discrete-time hazard rate model to 
estimate the causal effect on enrolment rates into higher education. We find that the reform 
had a small positive but statistically insignificant effect on enrolment rates.  
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1  Introduction  
In Germany, students from low-income families are eligible to student aid under the federal 
students’ financial assistance scheme (Berufsausbildungsfoerderungsgesetz, BAfoeG) which 
covers a substantial share of the monthly living costs of students enrolled in higher education. 
In the education policy debate BAfoeG is typically rationalized by its supposedly positive 
effect on enrolment rates into higher education of youth from low income families. The 
standard argument usually given in support for this belief is the presence of credit constraints 
to finance higher education preventing potential students from low-income families to enter 
higher education. Another popular argument is that, even in the absence of such constraints, 
youth from low-income families would effectively be prevented from enrolling into higher 
education because they are more reluctant to incur debt than those with a more affluent 
parental background. Thus, financial assistance provided through student aid is widely 
considered to be not only necessary for guaranteeing ‘equal opportunity’ in access to higher 
education but also to increase the proportion of school leavers who pursue tertiary education. 
Entering university education in Germany depends still very much on social origin. 
Figure 1 shows the development of freshmen students by social origin over the last decade, 
where a student’s social origin is derived by combining information on parents’ educational 
attainment and occupational status. The increase in enrolment over recent years is mainly 
driven by those students coming from higher and highest social origins, while the number of 
freshmen students from low social origin remained fairly stable over time. Since parents’ 
educational attainment is a good proxy for parents’ income which, in turn, is the major 
determinant of students’ eligibility to financial aid to students, Figure 1 does not indicate that 
the 2001 BAfoeG reform has achieved the intended effect of increasing enrolment rates into 
higher education of students from relatively poor families. 
Whether student aid is an effective policy instrument to raise enrolment rates into higher 
education is still a rather unexplored issue, not only in Germany but also internationally. 
Whereas there exist various studies on the effects of student aid on enrolment rates for the 
United States (e.g. Dynarski 2002, 2003; Kane 1995; Long 2003; Shea 2000) or Europe (e.g. 
Winter-Ebmer and Wirz 2002), this topic remains still rather unexplored for Germany. Lauer 
(2002) finds on the basis of a microeconometric choice model estimated on data from the 
German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) that extending the entitlement to BAfoeG seems to be 
more effective in raising enrolment rates in higher education than increasing the BAfoeG 
amount received by the individual student entitled to this subsidy. Using a different 
methodological approach and the same data source Baumgartner and Steiner (2004; 2005)   2
find that the BAfoeG reform of 1990, which changed student aid from a full loan system to a 
partial loan/grant system, had virtually no influence on enrolment rates into higher education.  





































Source:   Economic and Social Conditions of Student Life in the Federal Republic of Germany 2003 - 17th 
Social Survey; Federal Statistical Office Germany; own calculations. 
In this paper we evaluate the effect of the change in the BAfoeG eligibility rules introduced in 
2001 which increased the basic allowance on parent’s income (Freibetrag) and the level of 
the defined maintenance need (Bedarfssatz) by roughly 20 percent and 6 percent, respectively. 
This change increased both the amount of student aid for those already eligible to BAfoeG 
before the reform and the number of eligible students. We consider this change as a ‘natural 
experiment’ to identify the ‘causal’ effect of this particular policy reform on enrolment rates 
in Germany. Using data from the SOEP, our estimation results from a microeconometric 
transition rate model based on the difference-in-difference methodology shows that the 
BafoeG reform of 2001 seems to have been ineffective in raising enrolment rates into higher 
education. This somewhat counter-intuitive result m ay have important implications for the 
current policy debate on how to finance and to secure access to higher education in Germany 
and elsewhere.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
German system of student aid and the BAfoeG reform of 2001 analyzed in this paper. In 
section 3 we describe our sample design and data, and present our empirical method to 
estimate the effects of this reform on enrolment rates into higher education. In section 4 we 
summarize our empirical findings and present some robustness checks. Section 5 summarises 
the main results of our study and concludes.    3
2  The Structure of Student Aid and the 2001 BAfoeG Reform  
In order to provide some institutional background for the following empirical analysis, we 
start with a brief description of student aid in Germany, which is regulated under the German 
federal financial assistance scheme to promote education (Bundesausbildungsfoerderungge-
setz, BAfoeG). When introduced in 1971, this law was meant  to allow all qualified young 
people to enter university regardless of their parent’s financial capacity. BAfoeG was changed 
several times since then, and today subsidises also pupils in secondary education, further edu-
cation, and also those enrolled in vocational training courses. The main political goal of 
BAfoeG remains, however, to encourage students from low-income families to pursue higher 
education.  
Student aid is means tested, i.e. depends on the financial capacity of parents or of 
her/his spouse in case of married students. BAfoeG defines a maintenance need (Bedarfssatz) 
that depends on whether the student lives with her parents and possibly also on the costs for 
health care insurance for the student. To be eligible for student aid this pre-defined 
maintenance need has to exceed parents’ financial capacity which is the sum of household 
incomes from various sources, reduced by the income tax paid in the previous year, a lump 
sum for social security contributions, and basic allowances that depend on f amily status as 
well as any alimony obligations for other children (for a more detailed description, see the 
appendix). Currently, a share of about 50 percent of student aid is granted as an interest free 
loan repayable from future earnings after graduation, the other half is provided as a non-
repayable grant.  
The BAfoeG eligibility rules were changed on 1
st April 2001. The basic allowance on 
parents’ income was increased by about 20 percent and the amount of maintenance needs by 
about 6 percent, outpacing the increase in living costs. Figure 2 depicts the development of 
these two main determinants for the eligibility and the amount of student aid. The dashed 
lines show the nominal amounts as defined by the law, the solid lines show the respective 
amounts deflated by the consumer price index (in 2004 prices). The figure shows that in the 
early 1990’s the nominal increase of the basic allowance was outpaced by price inflation. The 
resulting decline in the real amount of the basic allowance and its subsequent stagnation was 
followed by a modest rise in the late 1990’s and a marked increase by about 20 percent in 
2001 due to the BAfoeG reform in this year. The amount of maintenance needs remained 
more or less stable in real terms throughout the 1990’s and slightly increased (by some 6 
percent) in 2001 due to the BAfoeG reform.    4
Figure 2: Real and nominal free allowance on parents' income and maintenance needs of 
students  
basic allowance on parents' income























































































real amounts deflated by CPI
 
Source:   Report of the Student Aid Council (Bericht des Beirats für Ausbildungsförderung); various years; own 
calculation. 
As shown in Figure 3, the changes in the eligibility rules due to the BAfoeG reform resulted 
in an increase in the average amount of student aid, measured in real terms, by more than 10 
percent in 2001. Between 2000 and 2002 the average monthly amount of student aid increased 
form 326 to 371 Euro, and the number of students receiving BAfoeG increased substantially 
by about 100 thousand to roughly 450 thousand people. Due to this reform, the fiscal costs 
have increased by about 50 percent to 1.35 billion Euro in this period.
1 To some extent, this 
strong increase compensated for the decline of the real value of student aid during the second 
half of the 1990s, as shown by the solid line in Figure 3. Starting in 2002, in real terms the 
amount of student aid has been declining in three consecutive years. 
                                                 
1 German Federal Statistical Office (2003); Fachserie 11 Reihe 7.   5
Figure 3:  Nominal and real average amounts of student aid (Euro per month) and changes over 









































































































































real amounts deflated by CPI
 
Source: Federal Statistical Office Germany, Fachserie 11, Reihe 7; various years; own calculation. 
 
3  Empirical Methodology 
3.1   Identification  
There are two potential endogeneity issues encountered in the estimation of the effect of the 
BAfoeG reform on enrolment rates into higher education. First, in our data we only observe 
eligibility to BAfoeG for those individuals who actually decided to enrol into higher 
education. That is, there is no direct information whether an individual with the formal 
entrance requirement for university education would have been eligible for BAfoeG if she had 
decided to study. Obviously, we therefore cannot directly use the information whether a 
student receives BAfoeG or not to construct an indicator variable for inclusion in a regression 
model explaining enrolment into higher education. Second, even if we could observe BAfoeG 
eligibility for all potential students including such an indicator as an explanatory variable in a 
regression model could still cause the usual endogeneity problem related to the correlation of 
both  this variable and the decision to enrol into higher education with some unobserved 
individual effects. One way to deal with this problem would be to estimate a selection model 
in the spirit of Heckman (1979). Another possibility, is to instrument the BAfoeG eligibility 
variable by some exogenous variable.  Such variables are typically hard to find, but in certain   6
circumstances may be provided by a ‘natural experiment’, i.e. an exogenous policy change 
affecting individual participation in some program but, by its nature being outside the control 
of the individual, having no direct effect on the outcome variable of interest (see, e.g., Angrist 
and Krueger 1999, Blundell and Costa Dias 2000).  
In this paper, we interpret the BAfoeG reform of 2001 described in the previous section 
as a ‘natural experiment’ which introduces an exogenous variation in the entitlement to 
student aid which we use to identify the ‘causal’ effect of this particular reform on enrolment 
rates into higher education. This exogenous variation derives from the change in entitlement 
rules due to the BAfoeG reform in 2001. This reform only affected potential students whose 
parents’ income remained below certain thresholds (the treatment group), as described above, 
and not those above these thresholds (the control group). In order to identify the causal effect 
of the reform on those affected by it, the following conditions have to be fulfilled
2: 
First, parents of potential students must not adjust their behavior in expectation of the 
reform in such a way that their children become entitled to BAfoeG. This could occur, for 
example, if parents reduced their labor supply so that their income would fall below the 
threshold which defines the treatment group. Although such behavior cannot be excluded a 
priori, especially not for those on the margin, to us it seems rather unlikely for the great 
majority of the relevant population. 
Second, the reform must not have been anticipated by students when deciding on 
enrolment into higher education. For the following reasons, we believe this to be the case. In 
Germany, the winter term starts for all universities on 1
st October. Due to the central study 
place allocation agency (Zentrale Studienplatzvergabe, ZVS) and internal regulations of the 
universities, students have to apply in almost all circumstances not later than 15
th July to 
commence studying the coming winter term. Plans to use the revenues from the sold UMTS-
licences to finance the BAfoeG reform were first publicly revealed in October 2000, followed 
by the passing of the law in the German parliament in February 2001 which came into effect 
on 1
st April 2001, when the new summer term started. Since the political debate to reform 
BAfoeG started in the same month (October) when the winter term began, it seems very 
                                                 
2   Assume the regression model yit = a0 + b’Xit + c1GDit + c2TDit+d(GD·TD)it+uit, with GD=1: individual i 
belongs to the treatment group, GD=0: control group, TD=1: observation period t belongs to the post-reform 
period, TD=0: pre-reform period, GD·TD := interaction term; X is a vector of exogenous variables, a0, b’, c1, 
and d are (vectors of) regression parameters, and u is an error term. In an OLS regression the parameter d 
identifies the causal effect of the reform on those affected by it (“treatment effect on the treated”) if:  
E(uit | X, GD = 1, TD=1) - E(uit | X, GD = 1, TD=0):= DE(uit | X, GD=1) = DE(uit | X, GD=0). That is, 
conditional on X,  the expected change of error terms between the pre-reform and post-reform periods in the 
two groups must be balanced. This assumption would be violated if either of the three conditions discussed in 
the text were not fulfilled.   7
unlikely that students could postpone enrolment to the summer term in order  to take 
advantage of the more generous student aid regulations right from their first semester.  
The third condition is that, conditional on observable variables, enrolment rates of the 
treatment and the control group would not have developed differently in the absence of the 
BAfoeG reform. That is, we have to assume that time trends do not differ between the two 
groups (common trend assumption). This assumption cannot really be tested under the 
alternative hypothesis of a non-zero causal effect of the reform on enrolment rates but, as we 
show below, informal checks suggest that this assumption may hold empirically.  
Given these conditions are met, the causal effect of the BAfoeG reform on enrolment 
into higher education could, in principle, be estimated by applying the simple difference-in-
difference (DD) estimator to grouped data. The DD-estimator identifies the average effect of 
the reform on the enrolment rate of people affected by the reform, i.e. the “average treatment 
effect on the treated” (see, e.g., Angrist and Krueger 1999, Blundell and Costa Dias 2000). 
The simplest way to estimate this effect would be to take the differences in mean enrolment 
rates of students eligible to BAfoeG (treatment group) and of students not eligible to BAfoeG 
and thus not affected by the reform (control group), both before and after the reform, and then 
take the difference of these two differences. By aggregating the data this procedure would, 
however, yield inefficient estimates of the average treatment effect. Furthermore, this simple 
estimator cannot account for changes in the composition of the treatment and control groups 
due to sample attrition and right-censoring of observations related to our sampling design. As 
described in the next section, given our sample design it is essential to account for this in the 
econometric model. 
3.2   Data and Sample Design 
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). This is 
a longitudinal survey of individuals living in private households in Germany covering each 
year since 1984.
3 We restrict the sample to people with completed upper secondary schooling, 
since only those are entitled to enrol into higher education in Germany. Our focus is on the 
transition from upper secondary schooling into higher education. Since, for various reasons
4, a 
large share of all school leavers who eventually enrol into higher education do so only after 
some time has elapsed, we allow for a  transition period of up to three years after completion 
                                                 
3   We use the waves between 1992 and 2004 for our analysis. Haisken-DeNew and Frick  (2001) provide 
detailed information on the SOEP data.  
4   These r easons include, among others, military service between 10 and 18 month depending on the 
recruitment year, vocational training of up to three years, and the existence of so called ’Wartesemester’ 
(waiting terms) for obtaining a place of study in some subjects (like business studies, law, and medicine) 
allocated by the Zentrale Studienplatzvergabestelle (central study place allocation agency).   8
of upper secondary school. For the post-reform period, the three-years’ transition period ends 
in 2004, the year for which the most recent wave of the SOEP is available. Since we want to 
define the pre-reform period as closely as possible before the policy change took place and, at 
the same time, avoid a school-leaver cohort’s transition period to overlap with the post-reform 
period, we only include the school leaving cohorts 1996 and 1997 in the pre-reform sample 
for our basic estimation (see Figure 4). The post-reform sample includes the school-leaving 
cohorts 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003, where among the latter two cohorts a substantial share of 
all observations is right-censored at the time the observations window ends. In  alternative 
specifications of our transition model estimated below, we also include additional cohorts by, 
respectively, extending the pre-reform period and including the two ‘ambiguous’ school-
leaving cohorts of 1998 and 1999 whose transition period overlaps both the pre-reform and 
post-reform period (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4:  Sample design  
D=0 D=1
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3
0 1 2
0 1
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04
 
Note: “0” indicates the school leaving year; “1”, “2”, and “3” indicates, respectively, the first, second, and third 
year after schooling. Light numbers indicate ‘ambiguous’ school leaving cohorts, as defined in the text. If a 
school leaver has not registered with an university within three years, she is counted as a non-student.  
The derivation of individual school-to-university transitions from information contained in the 
SOEP is described in the appendix. Our sample contains 775 individuals with the required 
entrance qualification for tertiary education who completed upper secondary school between 
1996 and 2003. We had to discard 243 observations because of information on school leavers’ 
parents required for the simulation of BAfoeG eligibility was completely missing in the    9
SOEP.
5 Of the remaining 532 school leavers, 259 entered tertiary education within three 
years, 137 decided not to do so within three years, 43 are right-censored due to sample 
attrition, and 93 are right-censored due to the termination of the observation period in 2004. 
As mentioned above, for our basic specification we exclude the two ‘ambiguous’ school-
leaving cohorts 1998 and 1999 (142 school leavers), which leaves us with a sample of 456 
school leavers, of whom 396 are uncensored, and a total number of panel observations 
(number of individuals times average number of years observed in the panel) of 798 for our 
basic estimation. Descriptive sample statistics and information on the variables included in the 
transition rate model are given in Table 1 below, where we distinguish between school leavers 
eligible (treatment group) and those not eligible to BAfoeG (control group). 
Table 1 shows that roughly 50% of all school leavers enrolled into higher education 
within 3 years after having completed upper secondary schooling, about 22% made a 
transition to some other state (e.g., employment, apprenticeship training, unemployment), and 
28% are right-censored due to either sample attrition or the termination of the observation 
period in 2004. Enrolment amongst ineligible school leavers is about 8 percentage points 
higher than amongst those eligible for BAfoeG. Excluding censored observations from the 
sample shows a much larger increase in the average enrolment rate after the BAfoeG reform 
for school leavers entitled to student aid  – from 47% to about 83% – than for those not 
entitled to BafoeG (from roughly 60 to 80%). However, note that the share of censored 
observations among school leavers entitled to BAfoeG is considerably larger than among 
those not entitled to student aid.  
As shown in the table, the treatment of right-censored observations strongly affects the 
calculation of the enrolment rate for the two groups. Treating all right-censored observations 
as if school leavers did not enrol in university education within the three years’ observation 
window would lead to an estimated increase of the enrolment rate by about 5 percentage 
points for the treatment group and a decrease by about 10 percent for the control group. On 
the other hand, assuming all right-censored observations eventually enrolled in tertiary 
education would almost double the enrolment rate for the treatment group between the two 
periods, and also lead to a very strong increase for the control group. Of course, there is no 
reason to believe that the BAfoeG reform has either reduced the enrolment rate for the control 
group or that it has almost doubled the rate for the treatment group, nor can such changes be 
observed in empirical enrolment rates (see Figure 1).  For the consistent estimation of the 
                                                 
5   We do not expect this to lead to any selection problem because it seems unlikely that missing information on 
parents is related to the students’ decision to enrol into higher education.   10
effect of the BAfoeG reform on the enrolment rate into higher education it seems therefore 
essential to account for censoring in a coherent way, as described in the next section.    
Turning to the explanatory variables included in the model, Table 1 shows that the 
simulated share of students eligible to student aid (would they choose to study) among all 
potential students amounts to 45.6 percent in the sample. Of course, whether an individual 
actually receives BAfoeG is only observed for students and not for those who decided not to 
enrol into tertiary education, even though these individuals might have been eligible to 
student aid had they decided to enrol into higher education. We use a simple microsimulation 
model, briefly described in the appendix, to determine potential BAfoeG eligibility for each 
individual in our sample and for each year within the observation period. As mentioned in 
section 2 above, eligibility to student aid mainly depends on parents’ financial capacity 
relative to the student’s maintenance needs. In the calculation of potential BAfoeG eligibility 
we take all relevant income information of the student and her/his parents available in the 
SOEP as well as the relevant living circumstances of the parents and the student into account. 
Table 1 also reveals some marked differences between the treatment and control group 
regarding parental educational background, father’s occupational status, and nationality. For 
example, the share of  eligible students with a self-employed father is only 7.7 percent, 
whereas for ineligible students the respective share amounts to 21.8 percent. We also observe 
more students with parents who completed upper secondary schooling among ineligible 
students. Of course, these differences mainly reflect the positive correlation of household 
income, which determines BAfoeG eligibility to a large extent, and parents’ educational 
background or occupational status.   11
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
  Sample
a)  Treatment  Control 
Dependent variable       
observed in both periods (before and after)       
higher education = 0  0.224  0.202  0.242 
higher education = 1  0.491  0.447  0.528 
right-censored 
b)  0.285  0.351  0.230 
before (D=0)       
higher education = 0  0.151  0.130  0.169 
higher education = 1  0.200  0.115  0.270 
right-censored
 b)   0.031  0.034  0.028 
after (D=1)       
higher education = 0  0.072  0.072  0.073 
higher education = 1  0.292  0.332  0.258 
right-censored 
b)  0.254  0.317  0.202 
       
Covariates       
after  0.618  0.721  0.532 
eligible to BafoeG 
c)  0.456  1.000  0.000 
after · eligible to BAfoeG  0.329  0.721  0.000 
father self employed  0.154  0.077  0.218 
father white collar  0.404  0.389  0.415 
father civil servant  0.134  0.115  0.149 
father out of labour force  0.070  0.101  0.044 
male  0.458  0.433  0.480 
abitur  0.825  0.798  0.847 
school leaving age  19.421  19.351  19.480 
  (1.109)  (1.234)  (0.990) 
father completed upper secondary schooling  0.346  0.245  0.431 
mother completed upper secondary schooling  0.285  0.240  0.323 
German nationality  0.923  0.880  0.960 
East Germany  0.292  0.341  0.250 
       
number of school leavers (basic sample)  456  208  248 
number of observations  798  347  451 
average number of observations/person  1.75  1.67  1.82 
Notes:   
a)  refers to the sample used for our basic specification (see text) 
b)  right-censored due to incomplete observation window or sample attrition 
c)  simulation of BafoeG eligibility as described in the text 
   12
3.3   Econometric Specification 
We implement the DD estimator in a discrete-time hazard rate model which is the natural 
framework to analyze transition rates into higher education and also allows us to take into 
account the relatively large number of right-censoring in our data due to sample design and 
attrition. The observed variable statistically related to these transition rates is the duration 
between graduation from upper secondary school and enrolment into higher education. Since 
this duration is measured in years, we model the transition from completed upper secondary 
education into tertiary education in terms of a discrete-time hazard rate model. The duration 
of this process is described by a non–negative random variable, T, which takes on integer 
values only. If an observation ends in the interval (It–1, It], which will be one calendar year in 
our empirical analysis, this variable takes on a value of T = t. The hazard rate for individual i, 
( ) i t l , is the conditional probability of a transition into higher education in year t, given that 
no transition has occurred until the beginning of t : 
(1)  ( ) |,|,,
mm
iitiiit tPTtTt lee Øø ==‡ ºß XX  
with  i  =  1,2,...n  
Xit =  vector of covariates of individual i measured in interval t 
m e  =  time-invariant individual effect 
Following Heckman and Singer (1984), the time-invariant individual effects are assumed to 
have the following properties: 
(2) 






























with M-1 individual effects (“mass points”) and their respective probabilities to be estimated, 
and the M
th individual effect and its corresponding probability derived from the equalities 
given in equation (2). 
The survivor function, which gives the (unconditional) probability of not having 
enrolled into higher education up to period t, can be written as 
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In terms of the hazard rate and the survivor function, the probability of a transition into higher 
education in period t is given by 











Øø ==- ºß ￿ XXX  
Assuming that, conditional on  Xit, all observations are independent, the sample likelihood 
function is given by 
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Hence, for a person with an observed transition into higher education the contribution to the 
likelihood function is given by the respective transition probability  in equation (4), for a 
censored spell it is given by the survivor function in equation (3), both written in terms of the 
hazard rate. Note that the survivor function not only provides information on individuals 
right-censored at the end of the observation period, but also for those who left the panel due to 
sample attrition.  
It remains to specify a functional form for the hazard rate, for which we assume the 
logit specification, i.e.: 




















where the vector  T includes the baseline dummies to account for duration effects on the 
hazard rate, the vector Z includes possibly time-varying exogenous variables to control for the 
parental background and students individual characteristics, such as nationality, and region of 
residence. The vector DD includes a time dummy for the post-reform period (equal to one 
after 2001, and zero in earlier periods), a group dummy for potential students affected by the 
reform (equal to one for those affected, and zero otherwise) and an interaction term between 
this group dummy and the post-reform dummy. The coefficient of this interaction dummy 
thus identifies the effect of the BAfoeG reform on the enrolment rate into higher education of 
those affected by the reform (the ‘treatment effect on the treated’) under the assumptions 
stated above.   14
Plugging the hazard rate (6) into the likelihood function (5), ML estimates of the 
parameters, the mass points and their probabilities, taking into account the above mentioned 
restrictions on the individual effects, can be obtained by standard numerical optimization 
procedures.
6 
4  Estimation Results 
Column (1) of Table 2 shows results for the sample of our basic specification as described in 
section  3.2, columns (2)  – (4) summarize the estimation results for alternative sample 
definitions, which serves to check for potential sensitivity of estimation results for our basic 
specification.  
Before we turn to the estimated effect of the BAfoeG reform on the hazard rate into 
higher education, we briefly summarize our estimation results in general. Two mass points 
account for unobserved heterogeneity in transitions. We conclude that unobserved 
heterogeneity is present in our data, since the maximum log-likelihood in the model including 
two mass points improves significantly versus a transition rate model not controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity.
7 
Estimated coefficients of the baseline dummies, which are to be interpreted relative to 
the baseline rate in the first year after having completed upper-secondary schooling as the 
reference category, show that the transition rate into tertiary education increases in the second 
year and returns to its initial level in the third year.  
As to the other control variables, we find that fathers’ occupation, parents’ education 
and having a German nationality do not significantly affect transition rates into tertiary 
education. At a first glance, this may seem surprising since school attainment is known to be 
positively correlated with parents’ education and negatively with foreign nationality in 
Germany (see, e.g.,  Gang and Zimmermann 2000). However, since we are modelling 
transition rates conditional on having completed upper-secondary education rather than just 
the probability of enrolment in tertiary education, we are effectively analysing the last stage in 
an individual’s educational attainment process. That is, parents’ education may affect their 
children’s attainment in earlier stages but does not seem to affect transition from upper- 
secondary schooling into tertiary education. Similarly, foreign nationality seems to negatively 
                                                 
6   The gllamm programme as implemented in Stata 8 is used for the estimation. For a description and technical 
details see Skrondal  and Rabe-Hesketh (2004). 
7   Evaluated by the Akaike  Information Crterion (AIC) which simply compares the improvement of the 
maximum log-likelihood in the restricted and unrestricted model, adjusted for degrees of freedom. The 
restricted model yielded a log-likelihood of -425.99, compared to a value of –413.81 for the unrestricted 
model with one estimated mass point (see the first column of Table 2).    15
affect educational attainment only at lower levels of the educational attainment process. 
As mentioned above, the effect of the 2001 BAfoeG reform on enrolment rates into 
higher education is estimated by the coefficient on the interaction term between the group and 
the post-reform dummy. Although this effect is estimated to be positive, as expected, it is 
neither statistically significant nor is the point estimate economically very important. If it 
were significant, this point estimate would imply that  the average transition rate of those 
affected by the reform increased by 1.5 percentage points. This would mean that, due to the 
BAfoeG reform, the average transition rate into tertiary education of those eligible for 
BAfoeG increased from about 64 percent (see Table A1) to about 65.5 percent. At best, the 
2001 BAfoeG reform seems to have contributed relatively little to the strong overall increase 
of enrolment rates into higher education.  
The statistical insignificance of the estimated treatment effect may derive from the 
inefficiency of the DD estimator in conjunction with the relatively small number of 
observations in our sample. To check whether the estimated treatment effect would become 
more significant if we increased the number of observations, we have extended the pre-reform 
period and included all school leaving cohorts since 1992 available in the SOEP data in our 
sample. Estimation results for this alternative specification of the transition model are 
reported in column (2) of Table 2. Although the estimated coefficient of the treatment variable 
turns negative in sign and, in absolute value, becomes quite large, it remains insignificantly 
different from zero. This indicates that enrolment into higher education of older school 
leaving cohorts differs from that of the more recent pre-reform cohorts, which could be 
related to the development of student aid in real terms as described in section 2. We thus 
conclude that restricting our sample to the school leaving cohorts 1996 and 1997 is preferable 
to including older school leaving cohort as well, even if this leaves us with a considerably 
smaller number of observations.  
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Table 2:   Transition rates into tertiary education – Random-effects logit model 
Notes: 
a)  Robust standard errors are in parentheses  
b)  * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
c)  The table shows the log odds of prob(e1) and the corresponding standard error. The probability is 
reported in square brackets and calculated by exp(prob(e1))/(1+exp(prob(e1))).  e2 and prob(e2) is 
calculated to satisfy the properties of equation (2) given above. 
d)  Data source: SOEP 1992-2004. 









constant  -26.709  -26.191  -27.809  -24.026 
(4.285)***  (3.218)***  (4.499)***  (3.907)*** 
baseline hazard: 
year 2  1.430  1.108  1.591  1.156 
(0.375)***  (0.274)***  (0.552)***  (0.317)*** 
year 3  0.472  0.105  0.718  0.402 
(0.671)  (0.459)  (0.912)  (0.573) 
difference-in-difference: 
after  -0.121  0.076  0.353  0.066 
(0.388)  (0.328)  (0.522)  (0.328) 
eligible for BAfoeG  -0.556  -0.229  -0.504  -0.081 
(0.541)  (0.325)  (0.510)  (0.390) 
after x eligible for BAfoeG  0.096  -0.204  -0.193  -0.479 
(0.642)  (0.462)  (0.720)  (0.507) 
covariates: 
father self-employed  0.371  0.677  0.413  0.199 
(0.502)  (0.441)  (0.525)  (0.437) 
father white collar  0.590  0.499  0.620  0.350 
(0.488)  (0.346)  (0.530)  (0.406) 
father civil servant  0.955  1.049  1.016  0.969 
(0.571)*  (0.456)**  (0.623)  (0.480)** 
father out of labour force  0.339  0.657  0.191  -0.327 
(0.686)  (0.551)  (0.732)  (0.637) 
male  -2.091  -2.038  -2.370  -2.000 
(0.472)***  (0.369)***  (0.758)***  (0.418)*** 
abitur  1.973  2.030  1.572  1.862 
(0.633)***  (0.434)***  (0.966)  (0.495)*** 
school leaving age  1.211  1.151  1.272  1.106 
(0.205)***  (0.157)***  (0.222)***  (0.191)*** 
father completed upper secondary schooling  -0.522  -0.136  -0.468  -0.520 
(0.406)  (0.321)  (0.429)  (0.341) 
mother completed upper secondary schooling  0.689  0.414  0.716  0.933 
(0.367)*  (0.303)  (0.391)*  (0.328)*** 
German nationality  -1.116  -0.731  -1.149  -1.668 
(0.656)*  (0.428)*  (0.692)*  (0.753)** 
East Germany  0.862  1.026  0.937  0.912 
(0.389)**  (0.308)***  (0.427)**  (0.341)*** 
mass points: 
e  1  -4.179  -3.837  -4.141  -3.905 
(0.551)***  (0.405)***  (0.568)***  (0.481)*** 
e  2  2,649  2,658  2,878  2,668 
prob(  e  1  )  -0.456  -0.367  -0.364  -0.381 
(0.157)***  (0.118)***  (0.195)*  (0.135)*** 
[0,388]  [0,409]  [0,410]  [0,406] 
prob(  e  2  )  0,612  0,591  0,590  0,594 
N  456  691  456  598 
NT  798  1309  798  1083 
log-likelihood  -413.814  -662.461  -413.623  -563.940 
Base model 
Robustness tests   17
In specification (3) we have enlarged our sample by including ‘ambiguous’ cohorts, i.e. 
the school leaving cohorts of 1998 and 1999, which completed schooling just before the 
policy change and whose observed transition window overlaps with the post-reform period. In 
this specification, the estimated coefficient of the treatment variable again becomes negative 
in sign and more than doubles in size compared to specification (2), but remains statistically 
insignificant.  This result also indicates that the smaller sample used in our basic estimation is 
preferable to including also ‘ambiguous’ cohorts in the estimation. 
Another specification check we have performed is to estimate the transition model on a 
sample with the post-reform period defined according to the school leaving year instead of the 
enrolment year. This assumes that the policy change has an impact on school leaving cohorts 
instead of enrolment cohorts. The average treatment effect on the sample with an alternative 
post-reform definition becomes negative again, but remains insignificant. This might be due 
to the partially false definition, i.e. the school leaving cohort of 2000, for instance, is now 
defined to belong to the pre-reform period, despite the fact that  most of them enrol after the 
policy change.  
Overall, these tests suggest that our preferred specification  – as presented in the first 
column of Table 2  – produces the most reliable results, because the sample used in the 
estimation includes only people who left school as close as possible around the policy change, 
excludes ‘ambiguous’ cohorts and avoids confounding school leaving and enrolment cohorts.  
Finally, we have tried to check the plausibility of the key identifying assumption of our 
model, namely that enrolment rates of the treatment and the control group would not have 
developed differently in the absence of the BAfoeG reform. One way to check this 
assumption is to test for group differences in enrolment rates around arbitrary years, where we 
know that the policy has not changed. Figure 4 depicts the coefficient on the interaction term 
and the corresponding confidence interval. The specification is as in the first column of Table 
2 with the exception that the post-reform dummy variable is redefined. In 1998, For instance, 
in 1998 the dummy variable after takes on the value of unity in that year and thereafter, while 
it is zero in the years before 1998. This way, we have shifted the years of the hypothetical 
policy change between the years 1998 and 2003. The estimate for 2001, the year when the 
policy actually changed, depicts the coefficient and the corresponding confidence interval as 
given in the first column of table 2. Figure 4 shows that, except for the year 2001, estimated 
coefficients of this interaction term are all negative, although statistically insignificant in all 
cases.    18
Another way to check the plausibility of the key identifying assumption is to test the 
weaker assumption that both groups have been following a common time trend in the pre-
reform period. Allowing for a transition window of three years after completing upper 
secondary schooling, we can use the pre-reform period 1992 – 1997 to test whether time 
trends differ between the two groups. Estimating alternative specifications of our transition 
model with linear, quadratic, and non-parametric (with a dummy-variable for each year) time 
trends we could in no case reject the null hypothesis that enrolment rates of both groups 
follow a common time trend in the pre-reform period (see Table A1 in the appendix). Of 
course, this result does not prove that our key identifying assumption holds. However, the fact 
that enrolment rates of the two groups developed in a similar way in the pre-reform period 
lends, in our opinion, some credibility to this assumption.  
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Note:   The graph depicts the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between the treatment group 
dummy and a time dummy for alternative hypothetical reform years together with 95% confidence 
bands.  
5  Summary and Conclusion 
We have analyzed the effect of a change in student aid introduced by the BAfoeG reform of 
2001 on enrolment rates into higher education in Germany. This reform extended means-
tested student aid to households previously not eligible to BAfoeG and increased the average 
amount of student aid by about ten percent. An important aim of this reform was to encourage 
more students from low-income households to pursue higher education by providing more 
generous student aid. We have used the supposedly exogenous variation in student aid   19
induced by this ‘natural experiment’ to identify the causal effect of this policy reform on 
enrolment rates into higher education. 
Our estimation results show that this reform was ineffective in increasing enrolment 
rates of eligible students. One reason for this result may be the inefficiency of the DD method 
applied to identify the effect of the reform in conjunction with the relatively small number of 
observations in the SOEP. However, the point estimate of the treatment effect in our preferred 
specification is relatively small in size, implying that the BAfoeG reform, even if the 
estimated effect were statistically significant, increased the enrolment rate into higher 
education by only about 1.5 percentage points. In the absence of larger informative data sets 
for Germany, which would allow us to identify potential BAfoeG eligibility for both students 
and school leavers who choose not to study, we cannot really tell to what extent the 
insignificance of the estimated treatment effect is due to small sample size. In future research, 
more efficient estimates of the treatment effect could perhaps be obtained on the basis of a 
more structural microeconometric selection model using the same data set as in this study, 
although at the cost of arguably somewhat more restrictive identifying assumptions. This 
would also allow us to explore differences in the effects of the reform across the population, 
i.e. heterogeneous treatment effects, and possibly identify groups of school leavers for whom 
the reform might have been effective.  
An alternative explanation for the insignificance of the estimated treatment effect is that 
our basic identifying assumption of a common time trend for the treatment and control groups 
might be invalid. Although we did not find any evidence indicating violation of this 
assumption for the school leaving cohorts of 1992 – 1997 on the basis of our specification 
checks, we cannot directly test the validity of this assumption. For the moment, we therefore 
interpret our empirical results as being indicative for the ineffectiveness of the recent BafoeG 
reform in raising enrolment rates into higher education in Germany. 
Nevertheless, the BAfoeG reform could have had other beneficial effects on students. 
For one thing, the reform halted the long-term decline in the real value of student aid and the 
share of eligible people due to the failure to index basic allowances and maintenance needs to 
the increase in the cost of living during the 1990’s. The reform may also have contributed to 
reducing the duration to study, since students can more easily avoid working beside their 
studies and may thus be more likely to concentrate on their courses. But this was not the 
political aim of the analysed reform, and the analysis of this topic remains for further 
research.    20
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Appendix  
Derivation of School-to-University Transitions in the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP) 
Individual transitions between secondary and tertiary education are derived by combining 
information from various questions contained in each wave of the SOEP. For example, in 
wave J (1993) we start with question 72:  
“Since the beginning of 1992 have you finished school, vocational training, or university?”, 
and proceed with the next question:  
“What type of qualification did you get?” 
to define who has obtained a specialized upper secondary school degree (Fachhochschulreife) 
or a upper secondary school degree ( Abitur) and is thus qualified to enrol into higher 
education. This information is also contained in each successive wave in the SOEP from 
which each person’s school leaving year can be derived.  
Interviewees are also asked what they are currently doing in each year. For students, we 
can thus derive the enrolment year from the questions:  
“Are you currently in training, attending school, undergoing vocational training 
or attending a further training course?”, 
and, if the answer is “yes”: 
 “What sort of training is it?”. 
If it is either a technical college ( Fachhochschule) or university, we know the year and 
institution of enrolment. 
For the reasons mentioned in section 3.2, we allow the student to defer the enrolment 
decision up to three years. If a student does not attend higher education within three years, 
she/he is classified as a non-student.  
 
Simulation of BAfoeG Eligibility  
Whether an individual receives financial support through BAfoeG or not is only observed for 
students enrolled into higher education, not for school leavers who do not pursue university 
education. Since this counterfactual BAfoeG eligibility is not observable, we apply a small   22
microsimulation model to infer who would be eligible for the financial study support and who 
would not be, irrespective of an individual’s actual student status.  
The BAfoeG regulations define the maintenance needs for students conditional on the 
student's living situation, i.e. whether she lives with her parents or on her own, from which the 
financial capacities of the student, her husband, and her parents are subtracted. A student’s 
maintenance needs may also depend on the cost of health insurance. However, in case at least 
one of the parents is covered by the public health insurance system the student usually will 
also be covered by public health insurance free of charge provided the student’s own income 
is below a certain threshold. 
Parents’ financial capacity is the major factor determining BAfoeG eligibility where 
relevant income definition includes post-tax labour, asset and pension income. Income tax and 
social security liabilities are only available for the household and not at the individual level. 
In case parents live together we take household income, if they live in different households 
we take net income from the father's and the mother's household separately. If the father or 
the mother shares the household with another spouse, we take the half of net-tax household 
income. An allowance is granted on parents' income conditional on the family status and for 
each child that is entitled to alimony. A share of the remaining income – that again depends 
on the amount of alimony children in the respective household are entitled to  – is then 
subtracted from the maintenance needs. If the difference is positive the individual is eligible 
(BEt=1) for the study support. 
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The simulations routine runs for each individual over all observation periods.   23
Table A1:  Tests of the common time trend assumption in the transition rate model, school 
leaving cohort 1992 – 1997. 
Notes: 
a)  Notes as in table2. 
b)  The school leaving cohort of 1992 is the reference category for the non-parametric trends in column (3).  
c)  This specifications control also for covariates as well as group dummies for the difference-in-difference  








constant -26.210 -24.892 -27.173
(188.338) (6.130)*** (212.408)
baseline hazard:
year 2 0.546 0.922 0.765
(0.345) (0.438)** (0.346)**
year 3 -0.340 0.154 0.162
(0.571) (0.727) (0.595)
trend:
eligilbe for BAfoeG -0.094 0.833 0.190
(0.986) (2.979) (0.872)
trend -0.020 -0.605 --
(0.093) (0.852)








 x eligible for BAfoeG -- 0.064 --
(0.174)
1993 -- -- -1.212
(0.574)**
1994 -- -- 0.404
(0.641)
1995 -- -- -1.226
(0.654)*
1996 -- -- -0.332
(0.555)
1997 -- -- -0.433
(0.551)
1993 x eligible for BAfoeG -- -- 0.870
(1.135)
1994 x eligible for BAfoeG -- -- -0.926
(1.229)
1995 x eligible for BAfoeG  -- -- 0.721
(1.131)
1996 x eligible for BAfoeG -- -- -0.298
(1.304)
1997 x eligible for BAfoeG -- -- 0.766
(1.175)
mass point:
e1 -11.641 -3.893 -11.706
(329.772) (0.555)*** (355.113)
e2 6,656 2,816 7,008
prob(e1) -0.559 -0.324 -0.513
(0.158)*** (0.197)* (0.143)***
[0,364] [0,420] [0,374]
prob(e2) 0,636 0,580 0,626
N 339 339 339
NT 727 727 727
log-likelihood -364.666 -361.116 -359.344
equality of trends (chi2) 0.178 1.544 3.632
equality of trends (prob > chi2) 0.673 0.462 0.604